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
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D/Executive Secretary
21 January 1983



21 January 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Soviet Approach to Arms Control

One additional dimension on which something has to be said in the estimate on the Soviet Approach to Arms Control is where the Soviets are likely to be wanting to go in their force modernization improvement after a time frame of an expected START agreement. What should we be worrying about in terms of what we will have to match or handle or defend against or whatever after we succeed in getting a START agreement if that is to be the outcome? For this purpose we need to think now about what the Soviets have or may have in their basket re post-START. The estimate should certainly raise an alert as to the existence and importance of that question and speculate at least on the possibilities.

William J. Casey



